000			01978naa a2200193uu 4500
001			8082116243910
003			OSt
005			20220323142128.0
008			080821s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aREENOCK, Christopher M _935363
245	1	0	_aPolitical insulation, information exchange, and interest group access to the bureaucracy
260			_aLondon, UK : _bOxford University, _cjuly 2008
520	3		_aUnder political uncertainty, legislative coalitions have incentives to insulate policy from future coalitions. While there is evidence of legislators' use of agency design to insulate the bureaucracy from elected officials, little is known about the ultimate consequences of such design choices on the policy participation of interest groups. How such design choices affect group access is important because of the centrality of groups in providing both bureaucratic accountability and information for policy development. Accordingly, we examine the consequences of the so-called "insulation game" on group access to the bureaucracy. We develop an information exchange theory that portrays the impact of agency design choices on group-reported access as a function of the level of design-induced political insulation and the quality of the information offered by a given group. We test our theory with two original datasets that include design parameters of US state environmental agencies and survey data measuring reported agency access by state-level interest groups. Our results suggest that insulating agencies via design does lead to lower reported access to regulators by interest groups, but only among those groups who supply less valuable information
700	1		_928274 _aGerber, Brian J.
773	0	8	_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART _g18, 3, p. 415-440 _dLondon, UK : Oxford University, july 2008 _xISSN 10531858 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080821 _b1624^b _cTiago
998			_a20120521 _b1042^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c27302 _d27302
041			_aeng