000			01427naa a2200193uu 4500
001			8082215332210
003			OSt
005			20190211164202.0
008			080822s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aDONOHER, William J. _935399
245	1	0	_aIncentive alignment, control, and the issue of misleading financial disclosures
260			_aLondon, UK : _bSage Publications, _cAugust 2007
520	3		_aThe accounting scandals of recent years have raised concerns about the efficacy of incentive alignment and control systems. Among matched firms that either did or did not restate misleading financial disclosures during the period 1994-2003, both managerial equity ownership and contingent compensation were positively related to restatements when considered independently of other factors such as firm performance and board characteristics. When these variables were introduced, performance positively moderated the relationship between ownership and restatements, although contingent compensation was no longer significant. Finally, misleading disclosures were less prevalent in firms whose boards had high levels of business experience and long tenure
700	1		_aREED, Richard _935400
700	1		_aSTORRUD-BARNES, Susan F _935401
773	0	8	_tJournal of Management : J.O.M _g33, 4, p. 547-569 _dLondon, UK : Sage Publications, August 2007 _xISSN 01492063 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080822 _b1533^b _cTiago
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c27328 _d27328
041			_aeng