000			01848naa a2200181uu 4500
001			8091215260910
003			OSt
005			20190211164228.0
008			080912s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aTING, Michael M _935512
245	1	0	_aWhistleblowing
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cMay 2008
520	3		_aBy skipping managers and appealing directly to politicians, whistleblowers can play a critical role in revealing organizational information. However, the protection of whistleblowers can affect managers' abilities to provide employees with incentives to exert effort. This paper explores this tradeoff with a model of agency decision-making under incomplete information. In the game, an employee's effort determines a project's quality, and a manager chooses whether to approve the project and discipline the employee. The employee and politician wish for only “good” projects to be approved. By whistleblowing, an employee reveals the quality to a politician outside of the organization, who may override the manager's decision. A key finding is that from the politician's perspective, the benefits of whistleblower protections depend on the preferences of the manager. If the manager is inclined toward approving projects, then the costs of lower employee effort may outweigh the informational benefits of whistleblowing. The optimal policy may then be to ban whistleblowing. By contrast, when the manager is inclined toward rejecting projects, whistleblower protections prevent him or her from suppressing effort and are unambiguously beneficial
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g102, 2, p. 249-268 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, May 2008 _xISSN 00030554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080912 _b1526^b _cTiago
998			_a20081111 _b1509^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c27471 _d27471
041			_aeng