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008			080912s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aNICHTER, Simeon _935520
245	1	0	_aVote buying or turnout buying? : _bmaching politics and the secret ballot
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cFebruary 2008
520	3		_aScholars typically understand vote buying as offering particularistic benefits in exchange for vote choices. This depiction of vote buying presents a puzzle: with the secret ballot, what prevents individuals from accepting rewards and then voting as they wish? An alternative explanation, which I term “turnout buying,” suggests why parties might offer rewards even if they cannot monitor vote choices. By rewarding unmobilized supporters for showing up at the polls, parties can activate their passive constituencies. Because turnout buying targets supporters, it only requires monitoring whether individuals vote. Much of what scholars interpret as vote buying may actually be turnout buying. Reward targeting helps to distinguish between these strategies. Whereas Stokes's vote-buying model predicts that parties target moderate opposers, a model of turnout buying predicts that they target strong supporters. Although the two strategies coexist, empirical tests suggest that Argentine survey data in Stokes 2005 are more consistent with turnout buying
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g102, 1, p. 19-32 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, February 2008 _xISSN 00030554 _w
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998			_a20080912 _b1644^b _cTiago
998			_a20081113 _b1024^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c27475 _d27475
041			_aeng