000			01646naa a2200181uu 4500
001			8091216571610
003			OSt
005			20190211164238.0
008			080912s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aMYERSON, Roger B _935525
245	1	0	_athe Autocrat's credibility problem and foundations of the constitutional state
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cFebruary 2008
520	3		_aA political leader's temptation to deny costly debts to past supporters is a central moral-hazard problem in politics. This paper develops a game-theoretic model to probe the consequences of this moral-hazard problem for leaders who compete to establish political regimes. In contests for power, absolute leaders who are not subject to third-party judgments can credibly recruit only limited support. A leader can do better by organizing supporters into a court which could cause his downfall. In global negotiation-proof equilibria, leaders cannot recruit any supporters without such constitutional checks. Egalitarian norms make recruiting costlier in oligarchies, which become weaker than monarchies. The ruler's power and limitations on entry of new leaders are derived from focal-point effects in games with multiple equilibria. The relationships of trust between leaders and their supporters are personal constitutions which underlie all other political constitutions
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g102, 1, p. 125-140 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, February 2008 _xISSN 00030554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080912 _b1657^b _cTiago
998			_a20081113 _b1025^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c27482 _d27482
041			_aeng