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001			8091217020510
003			OSt
005			20190527151356.0
008			080912s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 d
100	1		_aBARTLETT, Robert C _9861
245	1	0	_aPlato's critique of hedoism in the Philebus
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cFebruary 2008
520	3		_aNo one can claim to have thought seriously about the question “How ought I to live?”, the guiding question of political philosophy, without having confronted the powerful answer to it supplied by hedonism. In thinking about hedonism today, we may begin from that thinker who was both very important to and early in its history: Plato. Of the dialogs that have come down to us as Plato's, only the Philebus takes as its direct aim the examination of pleasure's claim to be the human good. The Philebus culminates in the suggestions that the need for self-awareness or self-knowledge may finally be more fundamental to all human beings (and hence to hedonists) than is even the desire for pleasure, and that the experience of at least some pleasures constitutes a great obstacle to precisely the self-knowledge we seek. The Philebus is important today not only because it contains a searching analysis of hedonism but also because it compels us to raise the crucial question of the precise nature of “the good” with which we are justly most concerned—our own or that of others—a question whose centrality to self-knowledge we are in danger of forgetting
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g102, 1, p. 141-151 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, February 2008 _xISSN 00030554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080912 _b1702^b _cTiago
998			_a20081113 _b1026^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c27483 _d27483
041			_aeng