000			01720naa a2200193uu 4500
001			8091814270710
003			OSt
005			20190527151356.0
008			080918s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 d
100	1		_aEPSTEIN, Rachel A. _935578
245	1	0	_aBeyond conditionality : _binternational institutions in postcommunist Europe after enlargement
260			_aOxfordshire, UK : _bTaylor & Francis, _cSeptember 2008
520	3		_aAccording to the dominant incentive-based explanation, European Union (EU) conditionality has been particularly effective when the EU offered a credible membership incentive and when incumbent governments did not consider the domestic costs of compliance threatening to their hold on power. However, after the EU's eastern enlargement the influence of international institutions could then be expected to decrease in three different contexts: (i) the new member states after accession; (ii) the current candidate countries; and (iii) the postcommunist countries in the European neighbourhood policy. Yet although the incentive-based explanation receives support in some issue areas, in others, external influence is more enduring than predicted. To the extent that our understanding of the power of incentives is complicated by post-enlargement findings, there are new avenues for research into the full range of mechanisms that international institutions have at their disposal for influencing target states
700	1		_aSEDELMEIER, Ulrich _99748
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g15, 6, p. 795-805 _dOxfordshire, UK : Taylor & Francis, September 2008 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080918 _b1427^b _cTiago
998			_a20081028 _b1036^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c27552 _d27552
041			_aeng