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008 | 080918s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d | ||
100 | 1 |
_aVACHUDOVA, Milada A _935581 |
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245 | 1 | 0 |
_aTempered by the EU? : _bpolitical parties and party systems before and after accession |
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_aOxfordshire, UK : _bTaylor & Francis, _cSeptember 2008 |
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520 | 3 | _aParty systems of European Union (EU) candidate states follow a predictable evolution over time. Before negotiations begin, most major political parties respond to EU leverage by adopting agendas that are consistent with qualifying for membership. Consequently, the party systems - at least for a while - reflect a consensus on the direction of domestic policy-making. Candidate states where regime change in 1989 was followed by illiberal democracy or authoritarianism are the most interesting. For key parties in these states, pushing for EU accession is a marker of profound moderation in their agendas. Yet after EU accession, the parameters for party competition broaden again. The lifting of accession-related constraints is especially apparent among parties that adopt more nationalist and culturally conservative positions. However, preliminary evidence suggests that such parties have made only modest political gains | |
773 | 0 | 8 |
_tJournal of European Public Policy _g15, 6, p. 861-879 _dOxfordshire, UK : Taylor & Francis, September 2008 _xISSN 13501763 _w |
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_a20080918 _b1434^b _cTiago |
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_a20100614 _b1705^b _cceleste |
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_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c27556 _d27556 |
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041 | _aeng |