000			01482naa a2200193uu 4500
001			8103118072810
003			OSt
005			20190211164409.0
008			081031s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aINDRIDASON, Indridi H. _935708
245	1	0	_aCabinet reshuffles and ministerial drift
260			_aCambridge, UK : _bCambridge University Press, _cOctober 2008
520	3		_aA model of policy implementation in a parliamentary democracy as delegation between the prime minister and her cabinet ministers is introduced. Cabinet reshuffles can be pursued as a strategy to reduce the agency loss which occurs due to the different preferences of the actors. This work thus explains why prime ministers resort to reshuffles: cabinet reshuffles reduce the moral hazard facing ministers. This answer both augments and distinguishes this work from traditional perspectives on reshuffles that have emphasized the deleterious effects of reshuffles on ministerial capacity, and also from recent work that casts reshuffles as solutions to the adverse-selection problems inherent in cabinet government. The conclusion offers a preliminary test of some of the hypotheses generated by this theory
700	1		_aKAM, Christopher _935709
773	0	8	_tBritish journal of political science _g38, 4, p. 621-656 _dCambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, October 2008 _xISSN 00071234 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20081031 _b1807^b _cTiago
998			_a20081111 _b1114^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c27710 _d27710
041			_aeng