000			01836naa a2200193uu 4500
001			8110317252610
003			OSt
005			20190211164423.0
008			081103s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aWESTPHAL, James D. _911307
245	1	0	_aThe Pacification of institutional investors
260			_aIthaca, NY : _bCornell Johnson Graduate Scholl of Management, _cMarch 2008
520	3		_aA large-scale survey of U.S. top managers and fund managers is used to examine how managers may use interpersonal influence behavior to prevent powerful institutional investors from using their coercive power to force changes in corporate governance and strategy. We theorize that high levels of institutional ownership may prompt CEOs to engage in interpersonal influence behavior in the form of ingratiation and persuasion directed at institutional fund managers, which deters the latter from using their ownership power to coerce changes that could benefit shareholders at the expense of management. The results support our theory, indicating that CEOs' ingratiation and persuasion tactics toward institutional fund managers reduce the effect of institutional ownership on specific changes in board structure and composition, CEO compensation, and corporate strategy that are believed to compromise management's interests. Our theory and findings suggest the importance of considering how interpersonal influence processes can provide an alternative source of influence relationships between corporate leaders and external constituents
700	1		_aBEDNAR, Michael K _923308
773	0	8	_tAdministrative Science Quarterly _g53, 1, p. 29-72 _dIthaca, NY : Cornell Johnson Graduate Scholl of Management, March 2008 _xISSN 00018392 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20081103 _b1725^b _cTiago
998			_a20081106 _b0947^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c27732 _d27732
041			_aeng