000			01782naa a2200169uu 4500
001			8110416204210
003			OSt
005			20190211164431.0
008			081104s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aZHANG, Yan _935746
245	1	0	_aInformation asymmetry and the dismissal of newly appointed ceos : _ban empirical investigation
260			_aChichester, UK : _bJohn Wiley, _cAugust 2008
520	3		_aWhy are some newly appointed CEOs (i.e., those with tenure of three years or less) dismissed while others are not? Drawing upon previous reseach on information asymmetry and adverse selection in CEO selection, I argue that the board of directors may make a poor selection at the time of CEO succession, and as a result, must dismiss the appointee after succession when better information about him/her is obtained. Therefore, the level of information asymmetry at the time of succession increases the likelihood of dismissal. With data on 204 newly appointed CEOs, the results of this study support this argument. After controlling for alternative explanations of CEO dismissal (e.g., firm performance and political factors), the results show that the likelihood of dismissal of newly appointed CEOs is higher in outside successions and/or if the succession follows the dismissal of the preceding CEO. Further, if at the time of succession, the firm's board has a nominating committee that is independent and/or on which outside directors have few external directorships, the likelihood of dismissal is lower. Contributions to the CEO dismissal/succession literature are discussed
773	0	8	_tStrategic Management Journal _g29, 8, p. 859-872 _dChichester, UK : John Wiley, August 2008 _xISSN 01432095 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20081104 _b1620^b _cTiago
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c27745 _d27745
041			_aeng