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| 001 | 9011916193510 | ||
| 003 | OSt | ||
| 005 | 20190211164511.0 | ||
| 008 | 090119s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aARARAL JR., Eduardo _931910 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aPublic provision for urban water : _bgetting prices and governance right |
| 260 |
_aMalden, MA : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cOctober 2008 |
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| 520 | 3 | _aPublic sector monopolies are often associated with inefficiencies and inability to meet rising demand. Scholars attribute this to fundamental problems associated with public provision: (1) a tradition of below-cost pricing due to populist pressures, (2) owner–regulator conflicts of interest, and (3) perverse organizational incentives arising from non-credible threat of bankruptcy, weak competition, rigidities, and agency and performance measurement problems. Many governments worldwide have shifted to private provision, but recent experience in urban water utilities in developing countries has shown their limitations because of weak regulatory regimes compounded by inherent problems of information, incentives, and commitment. This article examines the paradoxical case of the Phnom Penh Water Supply in Cambodia to illustrate how public provision of urban water can be substantially improved by getting prices and governance right. Findings have implications for the search for solutions to provide one billion people worldwide with better access to potable water | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 |
_tGovernance: an international journal of policy, administration, and institutions _g21, 4, p. 527-549 _dMalden, MA : Wiley-Blackwell, October 2008 _xISSN 09521895 _w |
| 942 | _cS | ||
| 998 |
_a20090119 _b1619^b _cTiago |
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_a20090320 _b1435^b _cTiago |
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_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c27937 _d27937 |
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| 041 | _aeng | ||