000			01790naa a2200181uu 4500
001			9012713443010
003			OSt
005			20190211164610.0
008			090127s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aSMITH, Daniel A. _936044
245	1	0	_aDelegating direct democracy : _binterparty legislative competition and the adoption of the initiative in the american states
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cAugust 2008
520	3		_aBetween 1898 and 1918, voters in 20 American states adopted constitutional amendments granting citizens the power of the initiative. The embrace of direct democracy by voters invites inquiry into why some state legislatures opted to delegate to citizens the power of the initiative, while others did not. Drawing on an original data set, this article uses Event History Analysis hazard models to explain the puzzle of why legislatures might devolve institutional power to citizens. Our longitudinal, macrolevel analysis of socioeconomic and political forces reveals that political considerations—interparty legislative competition, party organizational strength, and third parties—are the most powerful predictors of a legislature's decision to refer the initiative to the ballot. Although several of our findings comport with the conventional wisdom explaining the adoption of the initiative during the Progressive Era, others are surprising, offering us new theoretical insights into why and when legislative bodies might be willing to divest themselves of their institutional power
700	1		_aFRIDKIN, Dustin _936045
773	0	8	_tAmerican political science review _g102, 3, p. 333-350 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, August 2008 _xISSN 00030554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20090127 _b1344^b _cTiago
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c28071 _d28071
041			_aeng