000			01736naa a2200205uu 4500
001			9012713592910
003			OSt
005			20220608172202.0
008			090127s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_919697 _aMorrow, James D.
245	1	0	_aRetesting selectorate theory : _bseparating the effects of W from other elements of democracy
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cAugust 2008
520	3		_aKevin Clarke and Randall Stone (2008) offer a methodological critique of some of our tests of the selectorate theory in The Logic of Political Survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). We accept their critique of residualization for control variables in those tests, but reject the contention that the size of the winning coalition does not predict the provision of public goods and private benefits. We present new tests that control for elements of democracy other than W and that do not use residualization. These new tests show that selectorate theory is strongly and robustly supported. Our measure of the size of the winning coalition is in the theoretically predicted direction and is statistically significant for 28 out of 31 different public goods and private benefits. Aspects of democracy not contained in the selectorate theory explain less of the variance than does the theory's core factor, namely, winning coalition size, for 25 of the 31 public goods and private benefits
700	1		_aBUENO, Bruce Bueno de _936046
700	1		_aSIVERSON, Randall M. _936047
700	1		_921985 _aSmith, Alastair
773	0	8	_tAmerican political science review _g102, 3, p. 393-400 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, August 2008 _xISSN 00030554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20090127 _b1359^b _cTiago
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c28075 _d28075
041			_aeng