000			01543naa a2200181uu 4500
001			9012818245810
003			OSt
005			20190211164639.0
008			090128s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aLEIPONEN, Aija _936109
245	1	0	_aControl of intellectual assets in client relationships : _bimplications for innovation
260			_aChichester, UK : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cDecember 2008
520	3		_aThis empirical study of business-to-business service firms examines the determinants and effects of control rights to intellectual assets in a property rights theoretic framework. Regression analyses using survey data suggest that service suppliers that retain control over their intellectual output are more innovative. In long-term relationships, service firms' clients may thus be better off balancing their need to control outsourced activities with the suppliers' incentives to invest in learning and innovation. Additionally, and aligned with property rights theoretic predictions, service suppliers' bargaining power and their indispensability in service projects are positively associated with their ability to retain control rights. In contrast, innovation capabilities are not very significant in determining control rights allocation between service suppliers and their clients
773	0	8	_tStrategic management journal _g29, 13, p. 1371-1394 _dChichester, UK : Wiley-Blackwell, December 2008 _xISSN 01432095 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20090128 _b1824^b _cTiago
998			_a20090128 _b1826^b _cTiago
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c28134 _d28134
041			_aeng