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001			9020319281910
003			OSt
005			20190211164715.0
008			090203s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aKNOTT, Jack H. _928155
245	1	0	_aWhen ambition checks ambition : _bbureaucratic trustees and the separation of powers
260			_aThousand Oaks, CA : _bSage Publications, _cDecember 2008
520	3		_aA credible commitment to property rights and contract enforcement contributes to sustained economic growth. Credible commitment suffers when private interests collude with government to secure private gain over the pubic interest. The Madisonian separation of powers system was designed to hinder this kind of private gain by political factions. In this article, the authors ask what role public agencies play in promoting credible commitment, arguing that principal-agency theory is suspect from the Federalist viewpoint, which assumed that elected officials are self-serving in ways that can harm the public good. They offer an alternative approach called trustee theory. Trustees sometimes can best serve principals by not being responsive to the principals' interests, especially when the principals' pursuit of self-interest threatens the public interest in the long run. The authors then discuss constraints that limit trustee discretion, so that they themselves do not become a primary cause of weakened credible commitment
700	1		_aMILLER, Gary J _97236
773	0	8	_tThe American Review of Public Administration _g38, 4, p. 387-411 _dThousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications, December 2008 _xISSN 02750740 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20090203 _b1928^b _cTiago
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c28204 _d28204
041			_aeng