| 000 | 01545naa a2200193uu 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 9022615312410 | ||
| 003 | OSt | ||
| 005 | 20190211164809.0 | ||
| 008 | 090226s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aCARRUBBA, Clifford J. _929412 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aJudicial behavior under political constraints : _bevidence from the European Court of Justice |
| 260 |
_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cNovember 2008 |
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| 520 | 3 | _aThe actual impact of judicial decisions often depends on the behavior of executive and legislative bodies that implement the rulings. Consequently, when a court hears a case involving the interests of those controlling the executive and legislative institutions, those interests can threaten to obstruct the court's intended outcome. In this paper, we evaluate whether and to what extent such constraints shape judicial rulings. Specifically, we examine how threats of noncompliance and legislative override influence decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Based on a statistical analysis of a novel dataset of ECJ rulings, we find that the preferences of member-state governments—whose interests are central to threats of noncompliance and override—have a systematic and substantively important impact on ECJ decisions | |
| 700 | 1 |
_aGABEL, Matthew _929413 |
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| 700 | 1 |
_aHANKLA, Charles _936406 |
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| 773 | 0 | 8 |
_tAmerican political science review _g102, 4, p. 435-452 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, November 2008 _xISSN 00030554 _w |
| 942 | _cS | ||
| 998 |
_a20090226 _b1531^b _cTiago |
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| 999 |
_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c28386 _d28386 |
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| 041 | _aeng | ||