000			01571naa a2200169uu 4500
001			9022615413610
003			OSt
005			20190211164810.0
008			090226s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aTUCKNESS, Alex _934808
245	1	0	_aPunishment, property, and the limits of altruism : _bLocke's international asymmetry
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cNovember 2008
520	3		_aThe standard interpretation of Locke assumes symmetry between punishment by individuals in the state of nature and punishment by states in the state of nature. The standard interpretation is incorrect because in cases where the punishment is altruistic, the state is not the functional equivalent of a person, having a more restricted power to punish. The asymmetry arises from Locke's contractualism because individuals in the state of nature might reasonably refuse to give governments the power to punish altruistically. This interpretation clarifies some ongoing puzzles about Locke's theory of property where questions about coerced sacrifices to benefit others also arise. Locke's argument is vulnerable to important objections, specifically that he equivocates on the meaning of the word “body,” that he places too much emphasis on the right of self-preservation, and that he legitimates nearly unlimited appropriation by states
773	0	8	_tAmerican political science review _g102, 4, p. 467-479 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, November 2008 _xISSN 00030554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20090226 _b1541^b _cTiago
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c28388 _d28388
041			_aeng