000			01288naa a2200169uu 4500
001			9022615462710
003			OSt
005			20190211164812.0
008			090226s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aTAVITS, Margit _934075
245	1	0	_aThe Role of parties' past behavior in coalition formation
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cNovember 2008
520	3		_aThis study considers whether and to what extent defections from a government coalition are punished. The study employs data on coalitions in eastern and western Europe from 1950 through 2006. The results show that if a coalition breaks due to conflict between partners or if one party withdraws from it, subsequent inclusion of the conflicting parties in the same coalition becomes less likely. Additional tests demonstrate that this effect occurs because defectors are punished by their former coalition partners. Another extension of the main analysis shows that rather than becoming pariah parties, defectors lose credibility only in the eyes of their former coalition partners
773	0	8	_tAmerican political science review _g102, 4, p. 495-507 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, November 2008 _xISSN 00030554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20090226 _b1546^b _cTiago
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c28390 _d28390
041			_aeng