000			01445naa a2200181uu 4500
001			9022615511010
003			OSt
005			20190211164812.0
008			090226s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aDESPOSATO, Scott _936409
245	1	0	_aGovernmental centralization and party affiliation : _blegislator strategies in Brazil and Japan
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cNovember 2008
520	3		_aWhat shapes politicians' strategies in political systems where pork, rather than programmatic platforms, wins elections? We argue that resource control provides much of the answer, as politics in pork-centric systems will in large part be organized around actors who control access to pork. We use new national and subnational data from Brazil and Japan to show how the degree of centralization of resources can affect party affiliation patterns. We find that in decentralized Brazil, both national and subnational politicians join parties that control their subnational government. In contrast, in our analysis of centralized Japan, politicians at both national and subnational levels base their party affiliation decisions on national-level partisan considerations
700	1		_aSCHEINER, Ethan _936410
773	0	8	_tAmerican political science review _g102, 4, p. 509-524 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, November 2008 _xISSN 00030554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20090226 _b1551^b _cTiago
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c28391 _d28391
041			_aeng