000			01806naa a2200169uu 4500
001			9030220043110
003			OSt
005			20190211164826.0
008			090302s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aSTUTZ, Jeffrey R _936468
245	1	0	_aWhat gets done and why : _bimplementing the recommendations of public inquires
260			_aToronto : _bIPAC, _cSeptember/Septembre 2008
520	3		_aPublic inquiries are often the instrument of choice when governments decide to re-think their approach to large issues, yet there has been little empirical research on how effective they are. This article is an evidence-based look at what affects the implementation of recommendations made by public inquiries. It considers eleven inquiries, examining how they operated, their political and administrative setting, and what action was taken on the recommendations. The central hypothesis is that governments do implement the recommendations of public inquiries under certain conditions. Such implementation extends not only to technical, incremental recommendations but also to recommendations involving systemic changes. The findings point to the role of judges who head and preside over inquiries as policy influencers. Often buffered by inquiry counsel or policy staff, judges may test potential recommendations with governments and other interested parties. The impact of inquiry hearings suggests that public inquiries do not necessarily serve a government's wishes to delay action. If inquiry hearings are the top item in the news, it is hard to see how that furthers a government agenda to bury the issues
773	0	8	_tCanadian Public Administration _g51, 3, p. 501-521 _dToronto : IPAC, September/Septembre 2008 _xISSN 00084840 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20090302 _b2004^b _cTiago
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c28438 _d28438
041			_aeng