000			01897naa a2200181uu 4500
001			9092215285313
003			OSt
005			20190211165436.0
008			090922s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aWHITFORD, Andrew B _911328
245	1	0	_aInstitutional Design and Information Revelation : _bEvidence from Environmental Right-to-Know
260			_bOxford Journals, _capr. 2009
520	3		_aHow governments design institutions for the revelation of information depends on how the costs and benefits are distributed across affected groups. In this study I examine the incidence of different kinds of constituencies and how governments give citizens access to information that affects them. A number of important studies have sought to understand the effect of such rules on the revelation of private information and policy outcomes, but we know little about the sources of those rules. Do the rules coincide with constituencies that benefit from their existence? Are they absent when strong constituencies can avoid bearing the costs of the rules? Using data on community "right-to-know" protections regarding environmental hazards, I compare the incidence of the benefits and costs of these design choices in the context of rules that reveal information and charge the cost of information revelation to the regulated community. The models show that the incidence of right-to-know protections depends on the presence or absence of constituencies that would enjoy their benefits or bear their costs. However, organizational costs limit the ability of affected constituencies to obtain institutional designs that reflect their interests
773	0	8	_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART _g19, 2, p. 189-205 _dOxford Journals, apr. 2009 _xISSN 10531858 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20090922 _b1528^b _cmayze
998			_a20120517 _b1420^b _cGeisneer
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c30067 _d30067
041			_aeng