000			01882naa a2200193uu 4500
001			9092215460013
003			OSt
005			20190211165443.0
008			090922s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aWENGER, Jeffrey B _931244
245	1	0	_aAt the Discretion of Rogue Agents : _bHow Automation Improves Women's Outcomes in Unemployment Insurance
260			_bOxford Journals, _capr. 2009
520	3		_aAutomation curtails the discretion of street-level bureaucrats in several ways: bureaucrats have little control over the input of data by claimants, management has increased opportunities for monitoring, and given the possibility that clients will deal with multiple bureaucrats, coworkers can now identify "rogue" agents. Some clients of a bureaucracy may benefit from the introduction of automation when the agency is biased against them. We test this claim by examining the recent introduction of the telephone claims in state Unemployment Insurance offices. Using state-level panel data from 1992 to 2005, we estimate the effect of filing a claim via telephone rather than in person. If street-level bureaucrats in this agency used their discretion to disentitle and punish clients who they deem "undeserving" of the policy benefits, then the introduction of automation could increase unemployment insurance (UI) payments for clients. Indeed, we find that telephone claims filing increases the number of women receiving UI benefits while having no effect on men. We posit that this finding is due to the elimination of the bias women previously faced when they entered a UI office
700	1		_aWILKINS, Vicky M _933784
773	0	8	_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART _g19, 2, p. 313-333 _dOxford Journals, apr. 2009 _xISSN 10531858 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20090922 _b1546^b _cmayze
998			_a20120517 _b1415^b _cGeisneer
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c30077 _d30077
041			_aeng