000			01595naa a2200193uu 4500
001			9092216062313
003			OSt
005			20190211165455.0
008			090922s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aKELLEHER, Christine A _923953
245	1	0	_aA Political Consequence of Contracting : _bOrganized Interests and State Agency Decision Making
260			_bOxford Journals, _cjuly 2009
520	3		_aWe argue that contracting opens a pathway for organized interests to lobby public managers. Using multilevel modeling techniques, we test this proposition with data from administrative agencies in the American states. We find that interactions between organized interests and managers increase in the presence of contracting. We then demonstrate that the influence of organized interests over key state agency decision making is driven, in part, by whether an agency contracts out for public service delivery. The findings suggest the presence of an alternate pathway for organized interests to access and influence government decision makers. Moreover, these results complement previous studies, which primarily highlight the potential economic benefits of contracting and hold important normative implications for our understanding of government responsiveness in an era of decentralized governance
700	1		_aYACKEE, Susan Webb _937728
773	0	8	_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART _g19, 3, p. 579-602 _dOxford Journals, july 2009 _xISSN 10531858 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20090922 _b1606^b _cmayze
998			_a20120517 _b1409^b _cGeisneer
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c30094 _d30094
041			_aeng