000			02232naa a2200181uu 4500
001			9092216120113
003			OSt
005			20190211165458.0
008			090922s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aGILAD, Sharon _935937
245	1	0	_aJuggling Conflicting Demands : _bThe Case of the UK Financial Ombudsman Service
260			_bOxford Journals, _cjuly 2009
520	3		_aThis article builds upon current scholarship regarding regulatory enforcement to analyze and theorize the little-researched context of public bodies' handling of consumer complaints against firms. The analysis is based on a case study of the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), which is a British public agency that handles consumer complaints regarding the retail selling of financial products. The study documents and seeks to explain the FOS' and firms' interaction and their choices between cooperative and adversarial strategies. It finds that the FOS' interaction with firms oscillated between cooperative informal conciliation and adversarial standardized determination of complaints. Firms resisted informal conciliation of complaints when concerned that their agreement to redress an individual complainant might be interpreted by the regulator (the Financial Services Authority), or the media, as entailing compensation awards to a large number of other customers in similar circumstances. Equally, the ombudsman was inclined toward an adversarial, precedent-bound approach to complaints when facing external risks to its autonomy and reputation. These findings form the basis for the formulation of hypotheses regarding the strategic interaction of other third-party complaint handling schemes with both private and public service providers. Furthermore, the findings stress the importance of analyzing regulatory encounters as multiactor games in which firms and regulators interact amid conflicting demands and uncertainties posed by other actors and institutions in their environment
773	0	8	_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART _g19, 3, p. 661-680 _dOxford Journals, july 2009 _xISSN 10531858 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20090922 _b1612^b _cmayze
998			_a20120517 _b1410^b _cGeisneer
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c30099 _d30099
041			_aeng