000			01810naa a2200193uu 4500
001			9111217200237
003			OSt
005			20190211165844.0
008			091112s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aKOVATS, Laszlo _938307
245	1	0	_aDo elections set the pace? A quantitative assessment of the timing of European legislation
260			_aOxfordshire : _bRoutledge, _cMarch 2009
520	3		_aMany parliamentary systems are marked by regular periods of higher and lower legislative activity. This legislation cycle is characterized by an increase in legislative output shortly ahead of elections and a decrease in legislative initiatives in the second half of the legislative term. This article shows that legislative cycles at the European level are different. First, it shows that the initiation of legislation peaks at the end of parliamentary terms rather than at the beginning. Second, the article shows that the adoption of legislation is only partially connected to the electoral cycle. Instead, the reallocation of agenda powers within the European Parliament twice during a legislature better explains the timing of the adoption of bills than the end of Parliament's term. This finding is especially relevant for legislation adopted under the co-decision procedure. The 'procedural cartel theory' of Cox and McCubbins (2005) combined with the 'economic theory of legislation' provide the theoretical basis that may explain this finding.
590			_aAgenda-setting; Count data analysis; Economic theory of legislation; EU; Legislation cycle; Timing
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g16, 2, p. 239-255 _dOxfordshire : Routledge, March 2009 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20091112 _b1720^b _cDaiane
998			_a20091117 _b1607^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c30841 _d30841
041			_aeng