000			01675naa a2200205uu 4500
001			9111315082837
003			OSt
005			20190211165849.0
008			091113s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aSAAM, Nicole J. _938313
245	1	0	_aPeer selection in EU intergovernmental negotiations
260			_aOxfordshire : _bRoutledge, _cApril 2009
520	3		_aIn this paper we present the peer co-ordination approach which we apply to EU intergovernmental negotiations. This approach seeks to contribute to liberal intergovernmentalist' bargaing theory (Moravcsik 1993, 1998). It assumes that EU integovernmental negotiations should be conceptualized as a rational learning process under uncertainty in which governments co-ordinate with peers in intergovernmental policy networks. In particular, we investigate the reasons why an EU government should select another government as a peer. Relying on a dataset on the EU Intergovernmental Conference of 1996 which led to the Amsterdam Treaty, we test five alternative hypotheses on peer selection (ex H1-H5). A random model provides us with a null model (H0) against which to test alternative models. We find that peer selection during these EU intergovernmental negotiations can best be explained by ex ante transnational co-ordination networks.
590			_aBargaing theory; EU; Intergovernmental negotiations; Peer co-ordination; Policy networks
700	1		_aSUMPTER, David _938314
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g16, 3, p. 356-377 _dOxfordshire : Routledge, April 2009 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20091113 _b1508^b _cDaiane
998			_a20091117 _b1610^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c30865 _d30865
041			_aeng