000			01633naa a2200193uu 4500
001			9111717474037
003			OSt
005			20190212114456.0
008			091117s2009 bl ||||gr |0|| 0 por d
100	1		_aFERRAZ, Alexandre Sampaio _938342
245	1	0	_aPrivatização e processo decisório
260			_aRio de Janeiro : _bIUPERJ, _c2009
520	3		_aThis article examines the political determinants of privatization of the fixed telephony sector in four countries, based on a neo-institutionalist approach. These countries faced similar pressures by telephone companies in favor of privatization, suggesting an apparent convergence in the sector's reorganization. However, although all four adopted some degree of privatization, the process followed different paths and designs in each country. This variation can be explained by the different institutional contexts in which the reforms were carried out. Where there was concentration of power in the Executive, privatization was launched "earlier" and approved more quickly than in countries in which such concentration was less intense. Meanwhile, the existence of multiple veto points and stakeholders with veto adoption by the Executive, forcing the latter to negotiate and form minimum consensus within the governing coalition.
590			_aPrivatization; neo-institutionalism; decision-making process; Executive/Legislative relations
773	0	8	_tDados - Revista de Ciências Sociais _g52, 2, p. 425-469 _dRio de Janeiro : IUPERJ, 2009 _xISSN 00115258 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20091117 _b1747^b _cDaiane
998			_a20091123 _b1036^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c30946 _d30946
041			_apor