000			01609naa a2200193uu 4500
001			9112316520537
003			OSt
005			20190211165903.0
008			091123s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aDELREUX, Tom _938374
245	1	0	_aThe EU negotiates multilateral environmental agreements : _bexplaining the agent's discretion
260			_aOxfordshire : _bRoutledge, _cAugust 2009
520	3		_aStarting from principal-agent theory, this article analysis the conditions under which an EU negotiator enjoys a particular degree of discretion vis-à-vis the member states during international environmental negotiations. A qualitative comparative analysis of eight EU decision-making processes with regard to international negotiations leading to a multilateral environmental agreement indicates that the compellingness of the international negotiations explains the occurrence of discretion. However, the international compellingness does not provide explanatory power to understand the particular degree of discretion. To understand when an EU negotiator enjoys a high degree of discretion, variables such as preference distributions, information asymmetries and institutional density need to be taken into account.
590			_adelegation; discretion; European Union; multilateral environmental agreements; principal-agent. qualitative comparative analysis.
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g16, 5, p. 719-737 _dOxfordshire : Routledge, August 2009 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20091123 _b1652^b _cDaiane
998			_a20091126 _b1144^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c31011 _d31011
041			_aeng