000			01660naa a2200205uu 4500
001			9112610585637
003			OSt
005			20190211165949.0
008			091126s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBRANDT, Urs Steiner _938437
245	1	0	_aTrawling for subsidies : _bthe alignment of incentives between fishermen and marine biologists
260			_aOxfordshire : _bRoutledge, _cOctober 2009
520	3		_aIn the fishing industry, fisherman traditionally have incentives to signal too many fish in the sea in order to have access to a high short-term catch level and subsidies, whereas marine biologists have incentives to signal too few fish in the sea. Marine biologists have an incentive to maximize their budgets both for altruistic reasons (to restore fish stocks) and for private reasons (by increasing demand for their services). We analyse the outcome of a game where the biologists and the fishermen are informed about the true stock size while the decision-maker is not. Our model shows that interest groups, traditionally perceived as opponents, may have mutual interests. Solving the current deadlocks in the EU fishery negotiations highlights the need to reveal the true incentives that motivate stakeholders, such as the symbiosis and alignment of interests identified here.
590			_acoalition model; EU; fishery; interest groups; political economy
700	1		_aSVENDSEN, Gert Tinggaard _921160
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g16, 7, p. 1012-1029 _dOxfordshire : Routledge, October 2009 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20091126 _b1058^b _cDaiane
998			_a20091126 _b1505^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c31094 _d31094
041			_aeng