000			01719naa a2200193uu 4500
001			9112611075337
003			OSt
005			20190211165949.0
008			091126s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBLAUBERGER, Michael _938438
245	1	0	_aCompliance with rules of negative integration : _bEuropean state aid control in the new member states
260			_aOxfordshire : _bRoutledge, _cOctober 2009
520	3		_aStarting from existing accounts on candidate country and member state compliance, the compliance record of the Central and Eastern European countries in the field of state aid policy is puzzling. Despite allegedly low compliance costs in areas of negative integration and despite the European Union's powerful instrument of conditionality, the candidate countries' state aid policies have been in striking contrast to European rules before accession. After accession they quickly brought their policies in line with European requirements. This compliance record is a result of the institutional structure of European state aid control, conceding extraordinary enforcement powers to the Commission, rather than of low compliance costs in this field. By shifting the burden of proof to potential state aid grantors and channelling enterprises' state aid demand, Commission control produces strong incentives to comply with European state aid rules.
590			_acompetition policy; compliance; conditionality; enlargement; negative integration; state aid.
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g16, 7, p. 1030-1046 _dOxfordshire : Routledge, October 2009 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20091126 _b1107^b _cDaiane
998			_a20091126 _b1506^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c31095 _d31095
041			_aeng