000			01767naa a2200229uu 4500
001			9121810121737
003			OSt
005			20190924103629.0
008			091218s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_93186 _a Egeberg,Morten
245	1	0	_aPolitical leadership and bureaucratic autonomy : _beffects of agencification
260			_aHoboken : _bWiley Periodicals, _cOctober 2009
520	3		_aPrevious studies have shown that agencification tends to reduce political control within a government portfolio. However, doubts have been raised as regards to the robustness of these findings. In this article we document that agency officials pay significantly less attention to signals from executive politicians than their counterparts within ministerial (cabinet-level) departments. This finding holds when we control for variation in tasks, the political salience of issue areas, and officials' rank. Simultaneously we observe that the three control variables all have an independent effect on officials' attentiveness to a steer from above. In addition we find that the more organizational capacity available within the respective ministerial departments, the more agency personnel tend to assign weight to signals from the political leadership. We apply large-N questionnaire data at three points in time, spanning two decades and shifting administrative doctrines.
590			_aVolume 22
590			_aNumber 4
590			_aOctober 2009
700	1		_aTRONDAL, Jarle _910797
773	0	8	_tGovernance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions _g22, 4, p. 673-688 _dHoboken : Wiley Periodicals, October 2009 _xISSN 09521895 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20091218 _b1012^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100217 _b1539^b _cDaiane
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c31293 _d31293
041			_aeng