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100 1 _aDAHLSTRÖM, Carl
_938770
245 1 0 _aThe bureaucratic politics of welfare-state crisis :
_bSweden in the 1990s
260 _aHoboken :
_bWiley Periodicals,
_cApril 2009
520 3 _aThis article suggests that key bureaucrats play a decisive role in times of welfare crisis. It argues that key bureaucrats, through their advice, define both the type of welfare crisis and the range of possible solutions, which have at least two important consequences: First, it broadens the distribution of welfare cuts, as key bureaucrats—contrary to politicians—have no interests in targeting special voter groups. Second, it enables political compromises, as both the government and the opposition trust the key bureaucrats' expertise. These suggestions are tested empirically in a case study of Sweden in the 1990s. It shows that key bureaucrats did indeed influence both the distribution of the cuts and enabled a compromise between the center-right government and the Social Democratic opposition.
590 _aVolume 22
590 _aNumber 2
590 _aApril 2009
773 0 8 _tGovernance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions
_g22, 2, p. 217-238
_dHoboken : Wiley Periodicals, April 2009
_xISSN 09521895
_w
942 _cS
998 _a20100205
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_cDaiane
998 _a20100217
_b1542^b
_cDaiane
999 _aConvertido do Formato PHL
_bPHL2MARC21 1.1
_c31554
_d31554
041 _aeng