000			01720naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0041309550037
003			OSt
005			20190211170852.0
008			100413s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBAUM, Jeeyang Rhee _933334
245	1	0	_aReining in the bureaucrats : _bdemocratic transition and administrative procedural reform in Korea
260			_aMalden : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cApril 2007
520	3		_aHow do civilian presidents control their bureaucracies after taking over from an authoritarian regime? To answer this question, I develop a "reining in" theory of delegation. I argue that presidents who faces intrabranch conflict over policy issues and cannot appoint—and dismiss—freely will solve their delegation problems through administrative procedure acts (APAs) and related laws. While some scholars argue that APAs are tools for preserving the status quo, I find that APAs help presidents change policy. Building on the delegation literature from economics, my theory represents a more general argument than prior theories for why presidents support APAs. I test the theory through a case study of South Korea's first civilian government (post-1961), under President Kim Young Sam. Kim initiated an APA to rein in a professionalized civil service that opposed his policy preferences. Strict procedural requirements designed to keep tabs on bureaucratic activities enhanced Kim's control over his bureaucracy.
773	0	8	_tGovernance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions _g20, 2, p. 233-254 _dMalden : Wiley-Blackwell, April 2007 _xISSN 09521895 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100413 _b0955^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100414 _b1454^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32308 _d32308
041			_aeng