000			01832naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0041309573237
003			OSt
005			20190211170853.0
008			100413s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aKOPPELL, Jonathan G. S. _95688
245	1	0	_aPolitical control for China's state-owned enterprises : _blessons from America's experience with hybrid organizations
260			_aMalden : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cApril 2007
520	3		_aChina's reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is intended to liberate the companies from bureaucratic control that hinders their management. Discussions of SOE reform, however, downplay the policy consequences. Can SOEs be "free" to succeed economically while some political control is maintained? Surprisingly, American experience with hybrid organizations—government-created companies that straddle the line between public and private—offers some precedent for managing the balance between political control and enterprise independence. Three strategies are derived for China. First, welfare functions must be stripped from SOEs and replaced by policy objectives compatible with commercial purposes. Second, reducing financial dependence on SOEs will remove a barrier to rational control. Third, and most importantly, a robust regulatory framework for control must be developed as a substitute for the weakened administrative linkages. The emerging control infrastructure rooted in state asset commissions is likely to prove ineffective for its blurring of ownership, administration, and regulation.
773	0	8	_tGovernance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions _g20, 2, p. 255-278 _dMalden : Wiley-Blackwell, April 2007 _xISSN 09521895 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100413 _b0957^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100414 _b1454^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32309 _d32309
041			_aeng