000			01904naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0041512555737
003			OSt
005			20190211170936.0
008			100415s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBEZES, Philippe _931636
245	1	0	_aThe hidden politics of administrative reform : _bcutting french civil service wages with a low-profile instrument
260			_aMalden : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cJanuary 2007
520	3		_aThe article addresses internal and hidden politics of changes in bureaucracies by focusing on the introduction and use of policy instruments as institutional change without radical or explicit shifts in administrative systems. Beneath public administrative reforms, it examines the use of "low-profile instruments" characterized by their technical and goal-oriented dimension but also by their low visibility to external actors due to the high complexity of their commensurating purpose and the automaticity of their use. The core case study of the paper offers a historical sociology of a technique for calculating the growth of the French civil service wage bill from the mid-1960s to the 2000s. The origins, uses, and institutionalisation of this method in the French context are explored to emphasize the important way of governing the bureaucracy at times of crisis through automatic, unobtrusive, incremental, and low-profile mechanisms. While insisting on the salience of techniques for calculating, measuring, classifying, and indexing in the contemporary art of government, it also suggests the need for observing and explaining "everyday forms of retrenchment" in bureaucracies.
773	0	8	_tGovernance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions _g20, 1, p. 23-56 _dMalden : Wiley-Blackwell, January 2007 _xISSN 09521895 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100415 _b1255^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100420 _b1359^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32371 _d32371
041			_aeng