000			01794naa a2200193uu 4500
001			0041610135337
003			OSt
005			20190211170951.0
008			100416s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aMARSH, Ian _96699
245	1	0	_aPragmatist and neoclassical policy paradigms in public services : _bwhich is the better template for program design?
260			_aRichmond : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cSeptember 2009
520	3		_aPrincipal-agent theory alerts principals to their problematic relationship with agents. The former are encouraged to take deliberate action to counter asymmetries in knowledge, moral hazard etc. To avoid this, principals should determine outcomes and contracts and incentives should be designed to achieve them. This approach has influenced the form of purchaser-provider arrangements, including the Job Network. This article reviews impacts, which include incentives for gaming and increased transaction costs. Another survey highlighted the extent to which innovation in the disability employment sector had depended on collaboration, which competition would end. The article then sketches an alternative pragmatic or experimental approach, which assumes that the centre can never establish outcomes that are other than provisional and corrigible. Program design needs to be built around this fundamental fact. Learning not 'carrots and sticks' is the appropriate form of relationship. The article explores the feasibility of this approach in a Job Network context.
700	1		_aSPIES-BUTCHER, Ben _939432
773	0	8	_tAustralian Journal of Public Administration - AJPA _g68, 3, p. 239-255 _dRichmond : Wiley-Blackwell, September 2009 _xISSN 03136647 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100416 _b1013^b _cDaiane
998			_a20101222 _b1117^b _cDaiane
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32388 _d32388
041			_aeng