000			01641naa a2200241uu 4500
001			0041610182037
003			OSt
005			20190211170953.0
008			100416s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBURTRAW, Dallas _939487
245	1	0	_aCollusion in auctions for emission permits : _ban experimental analysis
260			_aHoboken : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cFall 2009
520	3		_aEnvironmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for the use of auctions and that have not been studied previously. This paper reports on laboratory experiments testing three auction forms - uniform and discriminatory price sealed-bid auctions and an ascending clock auction. We test the ability of subjects to tacitly or explicitly collude in order to maximize profits. Our main result is that the discriminatory and uniform price auctions produce greater revenues than the clock auction, both with and without explicit communication. The clock appears to facilitate successful collusion, both because of its sequential structure and because it allows bidders to focus on one dimension of cooperation (quantity) rather than two (price and quantity).© 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.
700	1		_aGOEREE, Jacob _939488
700	1		_aHOLT, Charles A. _924434
700	1		_aMYERS, Erica _939489
700	1		_aPALMER, Karen _939490
700	1		_aSHOBE, William _939491
773	0	8	_tJournal of Policy Analysis and Management _g28, 4, p. 672-691 _dHoboken : Wiley-Blackwell, Fall 2009 _xISSN 02768739 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100416 _b1018^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100420 _b1532^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32390 _d32390
041			_aeng