000			01551naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0041910082437
003			OSt
005			20190211171048.0
008			100419s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aKERWER, Dieter _95519
245	1	0	_aRules that many use : _bstandards and global regulations
260			_aMalden : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cOctober 2005
520	3		_aGlobal regulation increasingly relies on alternatives to legal rules, variously termed "soft law,""best-practice rules," or "standards." Such voluntary best-practice rules can be highly effective. Standards influence users by virtue of the expertise on which they are based and because of their enforcement by public and private actors. Standards globally proliferate because they are more compatible with regulatory autonomy of states than binding directives. When global standards are effective, the question of how to subject them to democratic control often arises. The prospects for holding global standard setters accountable largely depend on how decisions on standards are made. These insights are illustrated by examples of the global regulation of financial markets. The preliminary evidence suggests that standards need to be taken more seriously by students of global regulation.
773	0	8	_tGovernance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions _g18, 4, p. 611-632 _dMalden : Wiley-Blackwell, October 2005 _xISSN 09521895 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100419 _b1008^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100419 _b1441^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32453 _d32453
041			_aeng