000			02006naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0041910285037
003			OSt
005			20190211171052.0
008			100419s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aTHATCHER, Mark _910604
245	1	0	_aThe third force? Independent regulatory agencies and elected politicians in Europe
260			_aMalden : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cJuly 2005
520	3		_aGovernments and legislatures in Europe have created or greatly strengthened independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). Yet they also retain many formal controls over those agencies. The article analyzes whether elected politicians have used their powers to create IRAs in their own image and kept IRAs under tight control or whether they have allowed IRAs to become a distinct set of actors, hence a "third force" in regulation. Principal–agent (PA) theories, largely based on U.S. experience, emphasize the importance of certain formal controls for elected politicians to limit "agency losses." However, an analysis of four European nations between 1990 and 2001 shows that elected politicians did not use their powers to appoint party politicians, force the early departures of IRA members, reverse IRA decisions, or reduce IRA budgets and powers. Using PA theory, two interpretations of this apparent puzzle are offered, each with differing implications for agency autonomy. One is that elected politicians used alternative methods of control, hence they suffered low "agency losses" and IRAs in practice had little autonomy. The other is that elected politicians found that the benefits of IRA autonomy in practice and the costs of applying their formal control outweighed agency losses, and hence accepted agency autonomy.
773	0	8	_tGovernance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions _g18, 3, p. 347-374 _dMalden : Wiley-Blackwell, July 2005 _xISSN 09521895 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100419 _b1028^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100419 _b1442^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32458 _d32458
041			_aeng