000			02049naa a2200193uu 4500
001			0041910330537
003			OSt
005			20190211171054.0
008			100419s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aMATTLI, Walter _96830
245	1	0	_aAccountability in accounting? The politics of private rule-making in the public interest
260			_aMalden : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cJuly 2005
520	3		_aOver recent decades governments have increasingly delegated domestic and international regulatory functions to private-sector agents. This article examines the reasons for such delegation and how private agents differ from public ones, and then analyzes the politics of regulation post delegation. It argues that the key difference between delegation to a public agent and delegation to a private one is that in the latter case a multiple-principals problem emerges that is qualitatively different from the one usually considered in the literature. An agent's action will be determined by the relative tightness of competing principal–agent relationships. This tightness is a function of the relative importance of each principal for the agent's financial and operational viability as well as its effectiveness in rule making. Further, the article posits that exogenous changes in the macro-political climate can deeply affect the nature of principal–agent relationships. The authors test their hypotheses about the politics of regulation in the postdelegation period through the study of accounting standards setting in the United States, a case of delegation of regulatory authority to a private agent that goes back to the New Deal era and has received renewed public attention in the wake of recent corporate financial scandals.
700	1		_aBÜTHE, Tim _91643
773	0	8	_tGovernance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions _g18, 3, p. 399-430 _dMalden : Wiley-Blackwell, July 2005 _xISSN 09521895 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100419 _b1033^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100419 _b1443^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32461 _d32461
041			_aeng