000			01639naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0041910370437
003			OSt
005			20190211171055.0
008			100419s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aKERWER, Dieter _95519
245	1	0	_aHolding global regulators accountable : _bthe case of credit rating agencies
260			_aMalden : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cJuly 2005
520	3		_aCredit Rating Agencies (CRAs) are private nonmajoritarian regulators (NMRs) of international capital markets. Ratings of creditworthiness are ubiquitous in financial markets, and in this way they exercise considerable control over the flow of credit. CRAs entail a puzzle for the question of the legitimacy of global regulation. As profit seeking firms, they lack a formal element of coercion. Yet, CRAs are often criticized for wielding illegitimate power. Furthermore, the broad demand for accountability has not had a great effect on how CRAs operate. Thus, there is a persistent mismatch between demand and supply of accountability, an "accountability gap." By analyzing the accountability gap, this article seeks to enhance the understanding of the nature and the scope of the legitimacy problems of global NMRs. CRAs suggest that the legitimacy problems of global governance extend beyond formal NMRs to informal NMRs and that solutions sometimes are elusive.
773	0	8	_tGovernance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions _g18, 3, p. 453-476 _dMalden : Wiley-Blackwell, July 2005 _xISSN 09521895 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100419 _b1037^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100420 _b1423^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32463 _d32463
041			_aeng