000			01656naa a2200205uu 4500
001			0042611092137
003			OSt
005			20190211171157.0
008			100426s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBOSSE, Douglas A. _939641
245	1	0	_aStakeholders, reciprocity, and firm performance
260			_aBognor Regis : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cApril 2009
520	3		_aThe assumption that economic actors behave in a boundedly self-interested manner promises fruitful new insights for strategic management. A growing literature spanning multiple disciplines indicates most actors' selfish utility maximizing behaviors are bounded by norms of fairness. Rather than being purely self-interested, people behave reciprocally by rewarding others whose actions they deem fair and willingly incurring costs to punish those they deem unfair. Economists show that employers who are perceived as distributionally fair by their employees generate comparatively more value due to the positively reciprocal behavior of those employees. The organizational justice literature distinguishes two additional types of fairness assessed by employees. Drawing from both these bodies of work, we employ stakeholder theory to propose how perceptions of fairness result in reciprocity (1) extending to all stakeholders of the firm and (2) affecting firm performance.
700	1		_aPHILLIS, Robert A. _939642
700	1		_aHARRISON, Jeffrey S. _939643
773	0	8	_tStrategic Management Journal _g30, 4, p. 447-456 _dBognor Regis : Wiley-Blackwell, April 2009 _xISSN 01432095 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100426 _b1109^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100428 _b1707^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32568 _d32568
041			_aeng