| 000 | 01614naa a2200193uu 4500 | ||
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| 001 | 0042614245237 | ||
| 003 | OSt | ||
| 005 | 20190211171208.0 | ||
| 008 | 100426s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aZHANG, Yan _935746 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aStock market reaction to CEO certification : _bthe signaling role CEO background |
| 260 |
_aBognor Regis : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cJuly 2009 |
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| 520 | 3 | _aAs a direct result of the corporate scandals that started with Enron and led to general unrest in the financial markets, the Securities and Exchange Commission required chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers of large publicly traded companies to certify their financial statements. Using market signaling theory, we propose that attributes of the CEO send important signals to the investment community as to the credibility of the CEO certification and thus the quality of the firm's financial statements, which in turn impact the stock market reaction to the CEO certification. We find that a CEO's shareholdings and external directorships are positively related to the abnormal returns of CEO certification. Further, the stock market penalizes a firm with a CEO who is associated with the firm's prior financial restatement and rewards a firm with a CEO who is appointed after the firm's prior financial restatement. | |
| 700 | 1 |
_aWIERSEMA, Margarethe F. _925007 |
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| 773 | 0 | 8 |
_tStrategic Management Journal _g30, 7, p. 693-710 _dBognor Regis : Wiley-Blackwell, July 2009 _xISSN 01432095 _w |
| 942 | _cS | ||
| 998 |
_a20100426 _b1424^b _cDaiane |
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| 998 |
_a20100428 _b1702^b _cCarolina |
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| 999 |
_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32582 _d32582 |
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| 041 | _aeng | ||