000			01639naa a2200193uu 4500
001			0042614375937
003			OSt
005			20190211171213.0
008			100426s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aCAPRON, Laurence _91802
245	1	0	_aNational corporate governance institutions and post-acquisition target reorganization
260			_aBognor Regis : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cAugust 2009
520	3		_aWe examine the characteristics of national systems of corporate governance to theorize about the nature of the shareholders' and employees' interests when it comes to reorganization, under the assumption that the firm is coalitional in nature. We argue that corporate governance institutions prevalent in both the host and the target country of the merging firms enable or constrain the ability of the acquirer to reorganize the target. Using a cross-national dataset of corporate acquisitions and post-acquisition reorganization, we found support for our predictions that stronger legal protection of shareholder rights in the acquirer country compared to the target country increases the acquirer's ability to restructure the target's assets and leverage the target's resources, while the protection of employee rights in the target country restricts the acquirer's ability to restructure the target's assets and redeploy resources to and from the target.
700	1		_aGUILLÉN, Mauro _939667
773	0	8	_tStrategic Management Journal _g30, 8, p. 803-833 _dBognor Regis : Wiley-Blackwell, August 2009 _xISSN 01432095 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100426 _b1437^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100428 _b1701^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32587 _d32587
041			_aeng