000			01735naa a2200193uu 4500
001			0042614594037
003			OSt
005			20190211171221.0
008			100426s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBODOLICA, Virginia _939678
245	1	0	_aThe implementation of special attributes of CEO compensation contracts around M&A transactions
260			_aBognor Regis : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cSeptember 2009
520	3		_aThis study investigates how the implementation of special attributes of CEO compensation contracts is determined by both the acquisition and the acquirer features for a set of M&A deals undertaken by Canadian acquiring firms. Our findings reveal that when agency problems are higher, manifested by larger control premiums and poor firm performance, boards of directors tend to implement stronger mechanisms of incentive alignment around M&A transactions. Relying on multiple interdisciplinary logics that are activated to explain directors' ability to effectively perform their monitoring function, we show that boards are reactive rather than proactive in dealing with agency problems. Data are further interpreted in light of the unique aspects of the Canadian institutional context. Based on asymmetric risk properties of two different groups of executive compensation modes examined in this study, testing the substitution effects between alternative governance mechanisms is proposed as an interesting avenue for future research.
700	1		_aSPRAGGON, Martin _939679
773	0	8	_tStrategic Management Journal _g30, 9, p. 985-1011 _dBognor Regis : Wiley-Blackwell, September 2009 _xISSN 01432095 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100426 _b1459^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100428 _b1700^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32597 _d32597
041			_aeng