000			01621naa a2200193uu 4500
001			0042615055937
003			OSt
005			20190211171223.0
008			100426s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aHOETKER, Glenn _924779
245	1	0	_aChoice and performance of governance mechanisms : _bmatching alliance governance to asset type
260			_aBognor Regis : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cOctober 2009
520	3		_aFormal and relational governance mechanisms are used in strategic alliances to coordinate resources and mitigate the risk of opportunistic behavior. While recent work has shown that these approaches are not mutually exclusive, we understand little about when one approach is superior to the other. Using data on the governance choices and subsequent performance of alliances in the German telecommunications industry, we find that the optimal configuration of formal and relational governance mechanisms depends on the assets involved in an alliance, with formal mechanisms best suited to property-based assets and relational governance best suited to knowledge-based assets. Furthermore, a mismatch between governance mechanisms and asset type can harm the performance of the alliance. Our findings contribute to transaction cost economics, the literature on relational governance, and recent work studying their interaction.
700	1		_aMELLEWIGT, Thomas _939682
773	0	8	_tStrategic Management Journal _g30, 10, p. 1025-1044 _dBognor Regis : Wiley-Blackwell, October 2009 _xISSN 01432095 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100426 _b1505^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100428 _b1659^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32599 _d32599
041			_aeng