000			02042naa a2200193uu 4500
001			0042615170237
003			OSt
005			20190211171224.0
008			100426s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aDUSHNITSKY, Gary _924971
245	1	0	_aLimitations to interorganizational knowledge acquisition : _bthe paradox of corporate venture capital
260			_aBognor Regis : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cOctober 2009
520	3		_aBy highlighting conditions under which viable interorganizational relationships do not materialize, we explore the limitations of interorganizational knowledge acquisition. In the empirical context of corporate venture capital (CVC), we analyze a sample of 1,646 start-up-stage ventures that received funding during the 1990s. Under a regime of weak intellectual property protection (IPP), an entrepreneur-CVC investment relationship is less likely to form when the entrepreneurial invention targets the same industry as corporate products. In contrast, under a strong IPP regime, industry overlap is associated with an increase in the likelihood of an investment relationship. Our findings suggest that many relationships do not form because the corporation will not invest unless the entrepreneur discloses his or her invention, and the entrepreneur may be wary of doing so, fearing imitation. To the extent that a CVC has greater capability and inclination to target same-industry ventures, such industry overlap would exacerbate imitation concerns under a weak IPP regime, yet facilitate an investment relationship under a strong IPP regime. Beyond CVC, this insight may explain patterns of other interorganizational relationships, including research and development alliances and technology licensing between start-ups and incumbents.
700	1		_aSHAVER, J. Myles _922885
773	0	8	_tStrategic Management Journal _g30, 10, p. 1045-1064 _dBognor Regis : Wiley-Blackwell, October 2009 _xISSN 01432095 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100426 _b1517^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100428 _b1659^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32600 _d32600
041			_aeng