000 | 01896naa a2200205uu 4500 | ||
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001 | 0042616013837 | ||
003 | OSt | ||
005 | 20190211171237.0 | ||
008 | 100426s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d | ||
100 | 1 |
_aAARWAL, Rajshree _939707 |
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245 | 1 | 0 |
_aReputations for toughness in patent enforcement : _bimplications for knowledge spillovers via inventor mobility |
260 |
_aBognor Regis : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cDecember 2009 |
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520 | 3 | _a'Job hopping' by engineers and scientists is widely heralded as an important channel for knowledge spillovers within industries. Far less is known, however, about the actions firms take to reduce the outward flow of knowledge through markets for skilled labor. This study investigates the efficacy of a lever that has received little research attention: corporate reputations for toughness in patent enforcement. Drawing on unique data on enforcement activity, intra-industry inventor mobility, and patent citations in the U.S. semiconductor industry, we find that a firm's litigiousness significantly reduces spillovers otherwise anticipated from departures of employee inventors, particularly when the hiring organizations are entrepreneurial ventures. Surprisingly, the deterrent effects of patent enforcement are similar in magnitude for firms located in California, a state characterized by open norms for knowledge trading, and firms headquartered in other U.S. states. The study sheds new light on the strategic actions firms use to prevent rivals from capturing value from their investments in human capital and research and development. | |
700 | 1 |
_aGANCO, Martin _939708 |
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700 | 1 |
_aZIEDONIS, Rosemarie H. _939709 |
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773 | 0 | 8 |
_tStrategic Management Journal _g30, 13, p. 1349-1374 _dBognor Regis : Wiley-Blackwell, December 2009 _xISSN 01432095 _w |
942 | _cS | ||
998 |
_a20100426 _b1601^b _cDaiane |
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998 |
_a20100428 _b1653^b _cCarolina |
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_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32617 _d32617 |
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041 | _aeng |