000			01852naa a2200193uu 4500
001			0042710502537
003			OSt
005			20190211171244.0
008			100427s2000 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aDEEG, Richard _939722
245	1	0	_aInternational capital mobility and domestic institutions : _bcorporate finance and governance in four european cases
260			_aMalden : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cApril 2000
520	3		_aThis article considers the impact of international capital mobility on thecharacter of corporate finance and corporate governance in four European countries (Germany, France, Spain, and Italy). We take issue with the widespread view that the growth of international financial markets and the lifting of capital controls will in themselves produce convergence in national systems of corporate finance and governance. Although we find evidence of convergence in specific aspects of financial regulation (e.g., the abandonment of selective credit regulation and the dismantling of barriers to universal banking), these regulatory changes have not produced any clear convergence toward either the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate finance and governance predicted in much of the literature or the alternative German bank-based model. The reasons for this, we suggest, have much to do with the way in which the politics of financialreform are likely to differ from those postulated in market-driven models of regulatory change and the fact that countries are susceptible to international pressures in different ways.
700	1		_aPEREZ, Sofia _939723
773	0	8	_tGovernance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions _g13, 2, p. 119-153 _dMalden : Wiley-Blackwell, April 2000 _xISSN 09521895 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100427 _b1050^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100428 _b1644^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32634 _d32634
041			_aeng